> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://wp.qwertycoin.org/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://wp.qwertycoin.org/network-and-consensus/privacy-and-transactions.md).

# Privacy and transactions

Current transaction privacy mechanisms and their limits

Qwertycoin v2 inherits the mature CryptoNote/Monero transaction model and uses the HF16-era privacy baseline under QWC block version 17.

## Mechanisms

| Mechanism               | Purpose                                                                                        |
| ----------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| One-time output keys    | Prevent a recipient's public address from appearing directly as a reusable output destination. |
| Ring signatures (CLSAG) | Hide the real spent output among a ring of plausible outputs.                                  |
| RingCT                  | Hide transaction amounts while preserving verifiable balance.                                  |
| Bulletproof+            | Prove confidential output amounts are in range without revealing them.                         |
| View tags               | Reduce wallet scanning work without granting spend authority.                                  |
| Dandelion++ relay       | Reduce simple network-layer linkage between transaction origin and first broadcast.            |

The active minimum mixin is 15, corresponding to a ring of 16 members. The wallet selects decoys according to the current implementation; users and services should not construct nonstandard rings manually.

## Keys

A primary QWC address encodes public spend and view keys. The private spend key authorizes spending and message signatures. The private view key lets a wallet detect incoming outputs. Watch-only wallets can observe with view authority but cannot spend or produce a spend-key ownership signature.

EPoSE is separate: its operator and online service keys authorize service-node records only. They are not wallet keys and cannot spend service rewards.

## Privacy is a system property

Cryptography does not make every use anonymous. Address reuse, public mining identities, exchange records, service-node endpoints, timing, network observers and voluntary message signatures can create linkability. Users must evaluate the complete operational context.

The protocol does not claim immunity from global traffic analysis, compromised endpoints, malicious wallets or disclosure by third-party services. Always verify wallet software and keep private keys offline from public services.